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INTRODUCTION

The frequency with which a particular event has been experienced
has

long

been considered as a variable which influences human perception

and

memory.

Despite this pervasive treatment of frequency as an

independent variable, the manner in which frequency is perceived and
remembered has remained remarkably ambiguous.
search
and

has

has

In this light, much re-

treated frequency as the primary variable of investigation

sought to explicate the representation of frequency in memory.

Generally, frequency is thought of as some representation of the
repetitiveness with which a particular event is noted and stored by an
attending

individual.

Howell

(1973), however, has pointed out that

nature of frequency repre~enlaliun lur Jiflere11t typt:s

the

events

(i.e.,

_./':

UI

_ .....

~~

.. 1 .. -

:OJ L I IIIli I U::>

verbal vs. non-verbal stimuli) has not at all been

made clear.
If onlyverbal classes of stimuli are considered, the concept
of frequency
view of
in

still has many different connotations.

frequ.ency has referred to the usage of commonality of a word

the natural language.

and

One traditional

Francis

frequency

in

The Thorndike and Lorge (1944) and Kucera

(1967) word counts have provided some means of assessing
these terms.

These investigations 1 i tera 11 y counted the

number of times that English words occurred in large samples of printed
material

(i.e.,

books, magazines, and newspapers).

It is presumed that

word counts of this type provide information regarding an individual's
familiarity with a particular word.
this

In studies of verbal processes,

dimension of commonality or familiarity has typically been titled

"background frequency."

Numerous studies are avai luble which

(2)

demonstrate that ''background frequency" influences behavioral tasks
ranging

from tachistoscopic \'/or-d identification (Solomon and Hm1es,

!951) to the long-ter-m recognition of VJOr-ds in a forced-choice situation

(Gorman, 1961).
A second use of the term frequency is made in reference to the
occurrence of a verbal event rn a particular experimental context.
This operational definition has been labelled "situational freque'lcy."
Underwood (1969) has maintained that frequency in these terms is closely
correlated with the degree to which an individual learns that a verbal
event occurred in a given experimental setting; the more times that an
item occurs,

the greater the probability that it will be recalled.

Additionally, Underwood (1972) has pointed to "situational frequency'•
as a

~e-eminent

variable mediating the recognition and discrimination

of wor·ds in verbal learning tasks.

It is the nature and operation

of ••situational frequenc/ 1 that will be given careful consideration.
(Hereafter, the use of the term frequency will be limited to the
11

situational 11 definition.)

_T_he_ Nature _Of__
F_re_q~u_ency Representation
The manner in which frequency information is represented in
memory

is a topic which has generated considerable recent interest.

(cf. Howell, 1973).

The oldest and probably simplest position regarding

the representation of frequency is the

11

t race-s t rength 11 hypothesis.

This point-of-view holds that frequency information is mediated by some
internal process that grows progressively stronger with repeated
occurrences of a verbal event.

As Howell (1973) points out, any

behavioral manifestation of frequency such as disc~imination or

3
estimation is simply ''a matter of reading out cut-nmt strength values ( )

(p.4S)."
by

The

several

cably
can

tied

11

trilcc-strength" hypothesis, v1hile parsimonious, is plagued

difficulties.

For one, the operation of frequency is inextri-

to the formation of an overall memory trace for an event >vhich

undoubtedly be influenced by factors other than frequency.

The mean-·

ingfulness and concreteness of verbal items, for example, have also been
linked

to the degree of learning and hence to the strength of a memory

trace.

Also, because the operation of such a mechanism is presumed to

be cumulative

in nature, only a general strength value would be available

at a given time and little or no information would be present regarding
hovJ

and when the repeated events had occurred.

that

It is obvious, however,

individuals do possess information which allows fine discriminations

to be made along temporal and modality dimensions.
Hintzman

&

(Hintzman, 1969;

Block, 1970, 1971; Hintzman and Haters, 1969, 1970)

The research of Hintzman and his associates has prompted the
formulation of an alternative view regarding frequency representation
which

has

Hintzman

been
and

ca 11 ed

the "mu 1tip 1e-t race" hypothesis.

According to

Block (1971), the "multiple-trace" hypothesis states that

the effect of frequency is to increase the number of traces which exist
in memory.
dovm

With each repeated occurrence, an additional trace is laid

alongside those which are already present.

The various traces are

differentiated by some sort of "tag" which Hintzman and Block have
assumed

to be primarily of a temporal nature.
Support for the "multiple-trace" hypothesis has come from three

experiments which demonstrate that individuals are sensitive to both
temporal and frequency information and that frequency is dependent
upon
&

the temporal discriminability of repeated occurrences (Hintzman

Block,

1971).

In the first experiment, evidence was presented

indicating that individuals are fairly accurate in determining the

(4)

spatial-ternporul position of a study I ist item.

The subjects in this

study were asked to judge in which lOth of a 50 item list a particular
word had occurred.
A second experiment was more critical in formulating the
·~ultiple-trace 11

hypothesis and sought to determine the extent to which

two position judgments for a twice presented word could be made.

The

subjects were presented with a study list containing both once and twice
occurring items.

The twice presented words were of primary importance

and each of these words occurred in two different sections of the list
which were labelled A, B, C, and D.

These

11

zones 11 corresponded to

ordinal positions 3-8, 9-14, 15-20, and 43-48 in a 50 word study list
and were chosen on the basis of the first experiment which indicated
that these were the areas of maximum discriminability.

Different

combinations regarding the positions of the two occurrences resulted in
words which were labelled as AC, AD, BC, and BD items.
Hintzman and Block expected that the judgment of the first
occurrence of a word would be independent of the position of the second
if independent memory traces with temporal

11

tags 11 are present in memory.

Similar independence was, of course, anticipated for the second
occurrence.
predictions.

The results of the experiment essentially confirmed the
The first-position judgments for the AC and AD items did

not differ significantly ftom one another and were consistently
dissimilar to judgments made on the BC and BD items.

Conversely, the

second position judgments for AC and BC items were alike but differed
from judgments made on the AD and BD items.
The third study demonstrated that individuals are capable of
distinguishing recent from remote

11

situational 11 frequency.

The

subjects were presented with two 1 ists of words separated by a five

(5 )
minute interval.
occu rr

The two 1 ists were constructed such that 36 words

ed in both of the 1 ists.

Four words were assigned to nine

e~periment.ll conditions representing all combinations of three List

frequencies and three List 2 frequencies (0, 2, and 5 repetitions).

As

the "multirle-trace" hypothesis would predict, the subjects in this
experiment were quite good in judging the number of times which a
given item had occurred in each of the two 1 ists.
The "trace-strength'' and "multiple-trace" hypotheses do not
exhaust the possibilities and other positions regarding frequency
representation can be formulated by combining certain features of the
"trace-strength" and "multiple-trace" vievJs.

Underv.10od's position (1969,

1972) regarding the nature of frequency can be cited as an example of a
"multiple-process" hypothesis (cf. Howell, 1973).

His position evolves

from the conceptualization of memory for a verbal event as a collection
of attributes or properties which can be encoded during the presentation
of a given word.

Both Underwood (1969) and Wickens (1970) have advocated

that memory be viewed in these terms.

In addition, Underwood has

distinguished two major classes of attributes; one class serving to
discriminate one memory from another, the second acting as retrieval
mechanisms for accessing a target memory.

The former class of attributes

is represented by frequency, temporal, and modality information; all of
which presumably provide dimensions along which differences among verbal
events can be noted.

These attributes, however, are not necessarily

useful in the retrieval of the items.

The latter class of attributes

are associative in nature and do aid in the retrieval of verbal items
from memory.

Specific cues are established which allow otherwise

unavailable items to be reproduced during a test of memory.

For example,

if a group of words all belong to a particular taxonomic category and

( 6)

oded as such, memory for these items wi 11 be facilitated by
C

are en
·ng the category name as a retrieval cue at the time of recall.
i nvo k ' The conceptualization of memory as a collection of attributes has
given

frequency a double role in Underwood's views of memory.

On the

one hand, Unden'lood has stated in his 1969 paper that "frequency is a
maJor manipulable variable underlying learning; the greater the
frequency the better the learning" and that further "frequency is
normally associated with the strength of learning."

(p. 563)

This

statement intuitively appears to mean that frequency (at least one) is
necessary for any attribute to be encoded and that as frequency increases, more attributes are likely to be encoded thereby enha11cing the
memory for a given event.

This is, of course, consistent with a

"trace-strength" hypothesis.
Alternatively, however, Underwood (1969, 1972) has maintained
that frequency, itself, is encoded as an attribute of memory in much the
same way as acoustic orthographic, and associative properties of words.
This assertion is based on research which has attempted to break the
almost inevitable correlation between "strength" and frequency.

For

example, Underwood (1969b) has demonstrated that while words presented
only once in a long study list are recalled much better if they occur
at either the beginning or the end of the list than if they occur in
the middle, judgments regarding the number of occurrences for these
same items do not differ as a result of list position.
The studies of Hintzman and Block (1971) also make it necessary
to consider frequency apart from the overall strength of a memory.
Their results have shown that repeated occurrences of a verbal item
can be

idcntif~d

fairly well along a temporal dimension and thus

frequency and tempera 1 information are, of necessity, dependent upon

(7)
one a

nother to a large extent.

vieW,

Frequency, under the

11

multiple-tr·ace

11

is derived from the retrieval of temporally-marked traces at the

.
of a memory test.
trme

Undenvood, however, has preferred to consider

frequency

as an attribute distinct from temporal information and

therefore

his

hypothesis.

position is incompatible with the

11

multiple-trace 11

The reason is stated quite succinctly by Howell

(1973).

11ff an event memory is defined as the sum total of stored attributes,

and one attribute is frequency, then there is no vehicle to convey
multiple traces 11 because

11

frequency must be represented in order to

define an event, but multiple event representations define frequency.
(p.

11

45)
Apart from the above considerations, there are a number of

questions regarding the representation of frequency that are yet to be
answered.

It is probably safe to state that no one hypothesis can

reconcile all

of them and that some of these questions have not been

reconciled by any of the existing hypotheses.
frequency
meanings

encoded

For example, is the

from a particular word with a number of different

(a homograph) specific to a given meaning or is it merely

encoded via the generic representation of that word?

Additionally,

one wonders what constitutes a unit of frequency in different types of
verbal

materials

if it is assumed that frequency serves as a general

attribute of memory.

Does frequency always accrue to an individual

word even when it is presented in connected discourse or can frequency
accrue

to larger verbal units such as sentences?
The

functional

unit of frequency information is, of course, a

relevant consideration for either the

11

multiple-trace 11 hypothesis or a

position which considers frequency to be an encoded attribute of memory
(cf. Underwood, 1969)

If frequency is dependent upon the retrieval of

dent t 1-aces at the time of test, as the "mu It i pIe-trace"
indcpen

(8)

Js · c i nm1 1 i es, the question can be raised as to whether the
hypo tl1e 1·'
frequency

of sentence units as well as the frequency of the constituent

words can be derived following experience vJith stimulus material com. cd of meaninqful sentences.
·
pr1s

Demonstration of such an abi I ity would

indicate that the derivation of frequency involves something more than
the temporal-tagging of individual words in order to make them discriminable from one another.

Other information regarding the properties of the

sentences, themselves, (i.e. syntactic and semantic) would seem to be
necessarily imp! icated.

For example, an individual must be sensitive

to changes in wording when various paraphrases of a sentence are
presented for study, if he is to accurately assess the number of times
that a particularly worded sentence has occurred.

On the other hand,

attention need not be given to wording if one is to judge the number of
times

that certain words have occurred regardless of the sentence in

which they were included.

Finally, an additional situation is confronted

if one is asked to judge the frequency with which a particular idea
or meaning has been expressed without regard to the manner in which it
is stated.
~

neither

Again exact wording is not a relevant consideration but
the occurrence of individual words.

In this case, the seman-

tic content of the sentence whould be considered as the relevant unit of
frequency.

A demonstrated ability for judging the frequency of both

sentences and words included in sentences would imply that if an
explanation of frequency as an encoded attribute is to be accepted,
frequency would have to be noted and maintained in an independent fashion
for both types of verbal events (i.e. sentences and words).
It

is suggested here that frequency is derived at the time of

test as the "multiple-trace" hypothesis would contend, but that

ncy· estimates are mudc on the basis of whatever information is
freque -

(9)

relevant and necessary for the purticular type of frequency judgment
that is being requested.

A temporal

11

tag, 11 as Hintzman and Block have

indicated, is, of course, one but not the only dimension that can
function in judging the frequency of different types of verbal events.
With these considerations in mind, attention will be turned to some of
the experimental

paradigms in which behavioral manifestations of

frequency can be witnessed.
Discriminatio~

Verbal

Learning and Frequency Theory

Underwood (1969) has maintained that frequency is the predominant
attribute of memory involved in discrimination and recognition
processes.

Basic support for this position has come from experimental

work conducted within the verbal discrimination (VD) learning paradigm.
Generally, the VD paradigm involves the presentation of two items
for study with one being arbitrarily denoted by the experimenter as
correct.

On a later test trial, the items are again presented to a sub-

ject and he is asked to indicate which of the two words had been
previously labelled as correct.

During the course of a VD experiment,

study and test trials are typically alternated until some set criterion
of learning
In

is reached.

1966, Ekstrand, \.Jallace, and Underwood proposed the

11

Frequency

Theory 11 of verbal discrimination to account for performance in this
paradigm.

As the name implies, frequency is considered as the primary

determinant of learning and several mechanisms and rules are laid out to
explicate

its operation.

The theory describes four basic ways in which

frequency is accumulated for the presented words.

First, a pair of words

is presented; a unit of frequency accrues to each simply through the act

( 10)

of perceiving the items.

Ekstrand ct al. have r-eferred to this frequer1cy

input as a ;'re 1>resentational response" (RR).

Additional units of

frequency, however, may be added to the correct words by having the subject pronounce the right items.

The act of saying the correct item

aloud (pronunciation response, PR) allows the correct items to accumulate
a greater number of frequency units than the incorrect items during the
course of study and test trials.

Along tvith these overt mechanisms of

accumulating frequency, the theory has also provided for two additional
mechanisms which allow for covert accrual.

It is assumed that during the

course of VD learning, a subject will implicitly rehearse the correct
and possibly the incorrect items.

These "rehearsal responses" (RCR) also

provide additional units of frequency.

Finally, Ekstrand et al. (1966)

also point out that the presentation of any word has the possibility of
eliciting other words which one associates tvith the particular experimental

item.

These "implicit associative responses"(JARs) may be other

correct or incorrect words which are present in the VD 1 ist and these
implicit responses are assumed to increment the frequency of the actual
list items (cf. Underwood, 1965).
Ekstrand et al. assume that performance in the VD task is
mediated by a frequency differential which exists between members of a
given pair.

The manner in which this frequency information is stored is

not clearlydefined but the theory implies that some type of countermechanism tallies up the frequency units contributed through the different
processes and produces a sum total for each word.

The counter-mechanism

seems to suggest that a strength-notion of storage is involved since both
overt and covert presentations of a word contribute to the same
frequency total and the theory provides no means by which the different
types of responses can be distinguished from one another.

I

I'
i

I

j

(I I )

The frequency theory was originally developed in order to
jnterp r

et the results of a verbal discrimination study conducted by

~sc and Ekstrand (1964), but was subsequently extended
UnderviOO d , je - '

to other VD situations.

(cf. Ekstrand et al., 1966)

In the Underwood

et al. experiment, the subjects were given an initial VD list and then
transferred to a second 1 ist which was varied among the different
groups.

In one condition (R), the correct member of each pair in the

first list was retained as the correct item in the second list while a
new word vJas pr·esented as the other member of the pair.

In a second

condition (W), the incorrect item from a pair in the first list was
placed

h the second list with a new word becoming the correct member.

A control condition was also included in which the two lists were
unrelated.
The performance on the second 1 ist showed essentially 100% transfer
for subjects in condition (R), suggesting that frequency units can be
transferred betvJeen lists.

Transfer performance in condition (W), how-

ever, was quite different.

Initially, the subjects performed quite well

and \'<'ere superior to the control group.

As trials progressed, however,

the subjects improved very little and eventually fell below the performance of the control group.

Ekstrand et al. (1966) in their later

interpretation of this finding, maintained that the new words which w~re
correct in the second 1 ist rapidly gained frequency and soon achieved
the frequency level held by the old words.

As a result, the frequency

discrimination broke down.
These results of the Underwood et al. (196lf) experiment have
been explained in frequency theory terms by the postulation of two rules
which a subject may use in order to make a correct discrimination.
Rule 1 states that the word with the highest level of frequency is chosen

(I 2)
i tcm.
EkstrGnd
et
al.
bel
ievcd
that
this
WQS the rule
cor·rcc
t
as t '
employe d by the subjects in Condition R of the Undcr·wood et al. (1964)
~ 18

Rule 2 states thQt the word with the lower frequency is chosen

study.

he correct item.

as

t

in

Condition\~

Presumably, this strategy v1as used by subjects

at the outset of the tr·ansfer list, but this rule be-

came inappropriate as the frequency of the new items increased and thus
the subjects were forced to switch to the Rule 1 strategy later in the
transfer list.

The breakdown of the frequency differential has been

interpreted as the cause of the poor performance in the group with "old"
items retained as incorrect.

These results have been taken as strong

support for frequency theory although a total breakdown to a chance
level was not observed.
Ekstrand et al. (1966) demonstrated that this same rationale
could be used to explain the manner in which a single VD list is
learned.

Their experiment involved repeating the presentation of correct

or incorrect

items in different pairs during the presentation of the

same study list.

It was found that presenting a correct item in two

pairs facilitated overall VD performance.

It is assumed that additional

frequency units accrue to the repeated items thereby magnifying the
frequency between the repeated items and their incorrect counterparts.
Alternatively, presenting the same incorrect item in different pairs
deterred VD performance.

It is assumed here that the additional units

added to the repeated incorrect items eliminated the advantage gained
by the correct

condition

VJas

items through normal study-test procedures.

A final

included in which the repeated item served as the correct

Word in one pair but as the incorrect item in another.

Under this

arrangement, VD learning proceeded with great difficulty since in one
pair containing a repeated item, the correct word has a higher level of

frequencY'

~

(I 3)
·1

VIIi I

e

This necessitated that Ru 1c 1 (se 1ect the vJOrd with

frequencY I eve l.
"gl 1 .,st

the h 1

~

could

frequency) and Rule 2 (select the word with the lower fre.

bo th

quency )

in another pair the incorrect item had a higher

be used in the same 1 is t; 'a task that subjects apparent 1y

not do efficiently.
The Ekstrand et al. study also documented the operation of lARs

in VD

learning.

This V·Jas accomplished by including a particular word

and a high associate of that word in different pairs within the same
study

By manipulating the position of the given item and its high

list.

associate
items,

in conditions similar to those described above for repeated

it was found that lARs do operate in the accrual of frequency

units.
Additional supporting evidence for frequency theory has been
provided

by research that has fami 1 i ar i zed subjects with words 1ater

included

in a VD 1 ist.

Unden"..ood and Freund (1968)

1

for example, built

up the frequency of either correct or incorrect VD items through prior
free-recall learning trials.

Their results indicated that frequency

transferred from free-recall trials to VD learning in basically the same
manner that

frequency transferred from one VD 1 i st to another (cf. Under-

wood et a 1 . , 1961~)
Other research has indicated that perceived differences in
situational frequency which mediate VD performance are dependent upon
the

initial

found

or base level of frequency.

Underwood and Freund (1970)

that verbal discrimination becomes quite inaccurate when the

familiarization frequency of words later included in VD pairs is built
up to a high
incorrect
initial

1eve 1 but the in it i a 1 differences between the correct and

items in the subsequent VD learning are slight.

difference

For example, an

in frequency between correct and incorrect items was

rnuch more

( Jll)
discri1ninable if the familiarization inputs \"iere respectively

as opr,osed to 7 vs. 5.
3 vs. 1
hing·

5 ome t

the

Appa1·ently, frequency operates under

to the- psychoph"sical
lav1 of v/eber which states that as
'

·
a I(In

intensity of tlt!o stimuli is incl-eased, the difference necessary to

.
·,minatc the two must also be of a greater magnitude.
d 1 scr
A studyconducted by King and Levin (1971) shows results which
mewhat
are So
this

anomalous regarding frequency theory predictions.

experiment,

In

the subjects were transferred from one VD 1 ist to

(1964) investi-

another

in much the same manner as the Underwood et al.

gation.

One group of subjects received a second list which retained the

wrong

items

second
items

from List l as the incorrect words (Condition W-W), while a

group was confronted with a second list in which the correct
from List l became incorrect (Condition R-\~).

In addition, the

subjects were given varying numbers of trials (2, 4, and 8) during List
learning.
As would be expected from frequency theory, the initial trials
on the second 1 ist showed superior performance for the two experimental
groups VJhen
lated

lists.

they were compared to a control group which learned unreAlso, the effect of varying List 1 trials was more

pronounced in the R-W condition than in the W-W condition because of the
greater

frequencybuild-up for List l right items.

However, the

deterioration in performance over trials did not materialize as would be
anticipated from frequency theory predictions.
true in

This was especially

the case of eight List l learning trials.
The failure of King and Levin (1971) as well as the failure of

Underwood et al.
wrong

items

(1964) to obtain the predicted transfer effects for

in a prior list can perhaps be explained by some suggestions

made by Hintzman and Block (1971).

As indicated earlier, they were

("15)
· demonstrating that subjects are capable of discr-iminating
success fu l 'n
from

recent

a c ha'n

ee

subject

rcrnote frequencies.

They have argued that deterioration to

level would not be expected because in later Test 2 trials a
1•10 uld

be capable of ignoring frequency gained during List l and

discriminating \tlith only recent List 2 frequency.

A recent study by Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) has lent some
experimental validity to this explanation.

These investigators employed

a VD transfer task in which the designation of correct and incorrect
items
that

learned

in List l was reversed for the second list.

It was found

a temporal separation between the two lists reduced the extent to

which

transfer performance deteriorated only VJhen a relatively low

degree of List l learning (If trials) was given.
high List

learning

(8

Under conditions of

trials), a temporal separation did not aid the

subjects in distinguishing recent from remote frequencies and slight

deterioration effects were found regardless of whether a temporal
separation was provided.
Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) have argued that the differential
results produced by varying the number of List l trials may be due to
a confounding of the degree of List l learning and the temporal separation

between the initial trials of the original and transfer lists.

The frequencyaccumulated in early trials of original learning,is of
necessity, more temporally removed when

8

as opposed to

4

List l trials

are given simply because more presentation time is required.

Perhaps

this

prolonged separation between the start of List l and List 2 learn-

ing

in the case of 8 original learning trials allows the discrimination

of

recent and remote frequencies to be made without the addition of a

temporal separation between the two 1 ists.
Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) have also attempted to account for the

( 16)

•
• of King and Levin (1971) to obtain a deterioration in transfer
fa• 1urcnce follov1ing 8 List I learning trials. It v-1as reasoned that
performa ·
·nq List 1 uials l ikev;ise increases an individual's information
lncreas I - .
regarding List 1 context (i.e. the particular '-'vOI-ds included in the
· )
study I Is t .

If contextual information can aid in the discrimination of

nd remote frequencies, the failure of King and Levin (1971) to
recent a
obtain a deterioration in transfer performance may have been due to the
fact that the transferred items (either correct or incorrect) were
paired 1,vith new items, thus substantially changing the context of the
two lists.

Remote from recent frequencies could then have been very

efficiently discriminated on the basis of the contextual distinction.

In

the Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) study, however, the context of the two
lists was not substantially changed because the same items were merely
reversed in their designation of correct or incorrect.

With no relevant

·contextual information for distinguishing List l and List 2 frequencies,
the subjects were forced to rely on a temporal discrimination as
Hintzman and Block have suggested and in accord with earlier studies
(cf. Underwood et al.), a certain amount of deterioration in transfer
performance was displayed.
Other research which has investigated the role of lARs in VD
learning has also not wholly supported the expectations of frequency
theory.

A number of experiments have included transfer tasks that were

designed in such a way that List l items were expected to elicit lARs
which would be \vords subsequently included in the second list.
and Dean

1972)

'

(Kausler

1967; Raskin, Boise, Rubel, and Clark, 1968; Cole and Kanak,

In all of these studies, the predicted transfer effects were

'found only wen
h
I subjects were instructed in the relationships
t1e
between the two lists.

Although Ekstrand et al. (1966) have found that

( l 7)

lARs app
Jist,

arently do increment frequency in the learning of a single VD

the

does nO

incrementation of frequency through the production of lARs

t appear to readily transfer across lists unless individuals are

given a specific set to do so.
· t · on /·iemory and Frequency _l_n_f_o_r_m._a_t_io_n_
Recog n 1 1
- - - - - - -------

-

In many respects, a recognition memory task can be likened to

verbal

discrimination learning.

task,

In a typical forced-choice recognition

a list of study words is presented to a subject who is later asked

to identify these
or llnew 11 items.

11

0ld 11 words when they are intermingled among distractor

According to the frequency theory, the study list

presentation allows at least one unit of situational frequency to accrue
to the study words.

Therefore, the theory assumes, a recognition

decision can be made on the basis of a 1 vs. 0 frequency differential at
time of test.

This situation is, of course. not unlike the strategies

which are purportedly used by subjects in a VD task.
If both

recognition and discrimination are governed by frequency

information, subjects who are required to make either frequency judgments
or recognition decisions should show simi Jar performance when the input
conditions are identical.
appear to be the case.
viewed

identical

Underwood (1972) has shown that such does
In this experiment, two groups of subjects

study lists containing once and twice presented words,

and were later tested with a multiple-choice recognition task.

The

groups, however, differed in terms of the experimental instructions.
One group was told before presentation of the study list that they
would later have to choose the most frequently presented word when the
words appeared in a multiple-choice set.

The second group was instructed

that they were to learn the study list '01ords in order to correctly
recognize them in the multiple-choice test.

The results did, in fact,

( 18)
that errors resulting from frequency judgments and recognition

indicate

for

decisions

both once and twice presented words were of the same order

of magnitude.
Frequency theory predictions regarding recognition memory have
also

been

during

investigated by building up the frequency of distractor items

the

testing phase of an experiment.

(Underwood & Freund, 1970a)

In a series of experiments, new (or wrong) items were repeatedly paired
.,rith

several

1

expected

different right items during the recognition test.

that

It was

the recognition of the old items would become progressively

more difficult as the number of previous experiences with the distractor
items

during

studies

the recognition test became larger.

confirmed

In general, these

the view that as the frequency of the wrong item

increases, recognition decisions should become progressively more
d iff i cu 1 t.
The role
able
The

importance

of

lARs in recognition memory has also been of consider-

in extending frequency theory to the recognition paradigm.

theory stated by Ekstrand et al.

(1966) maintains that the

situational frequency of a word can be incremented through the word 1 s
occurrence as an IAR.
in

This assumption should lead to differential results

!

[

recognition memory depending upon the associative relationships

among

o 1d and new i terns.
Underwood (1965) demonstrated that in a continuous recognition

paradigm,

the probability of falsely identifying a word as

11

old 11 was

I
I

significantly higher if it was preceded in the list by a word which was
likely

to elicit it as an IAR.

In a similar manner, Underwood and Freund

(1968b) have found that recognition memory suffers when the distractor
items

are especiully designed as possible lARs of the study list words.

Both of

these experiments have been interpreted as strong support for

:i

( 19)
the pre-dominance of the frequency attribute in recognition memory.
The production of lARs has been somewhat indirectly demonstrated
as

a variable affecting forced-choice recognition in a study conducted

by Unden·mod and F1·eund (1970b).
indicated

Previous research (Gorman, 1961) had

that background frequency as determined by the Thorndike and

Lorge count

influences recognition memory.

In particular, the recogni-

tion of words is poorer when high-frequency words are used as study and
distractor items than when all low-frequency words are used.

It was

believed that these findings could at least be partially explained by
frequency

theory predictions regarding the role of lARs.

Underwood and

Fruend maintained that during the presentation of a study list, lARs will
naturally

be produced and that a greater number will be elicited when the

study words

have a high background frequency.

different effects.

These lARs can produce two

First, they can increment the situational frequency

of another study word which would facilitate recognition performance, but
alternatively,
which

they could increment the frequency of a distractor item

would produce a deleterious effect.
Word association norms show that 1ovJ-f requency words typ i ca 11 y

elicit

associations

role of

that are higher frequency words.

Therefore, the

lARs should be neg] igible under conditions where all low-

frequency words are used as study and distractor items.
decisions

Recognition

could then proceed, as frequency theory would predict, on the

basis

of the situational frequency accrued to the study items during the

study

list presentations.
The case in which all high-frequency words are used is consider-

ably different.
effects

of

carried

out

f\t first glance, it would seem that the opposing

lARs would cancel one another and recognition could be
in the predicted manner.

Underwood and freund (1970),

(20)

however, made a

cruci~l

assumption in order to explain the poorer

performance with high-frequency words.

In their own words, "adding an

additional unit of frequency to an old word produces a relatively small
increase

in discriminability ... thcrefore, the negative effect should be

greater than the positive effect when high-frequency words are presented
for study and nci•J words are also high frequency words." (p. 345)
In order to provide a theoretical accounting of the role of
lARs

in the recognition of words of varying background frequency, an

experiment was conducted in which high and low frequency words were
used

in all possible combinations of study and distractor words.

It

was predicted that the best recognition performance would be found in
the condition where high-frequency words were used as study items with
low-frequency 1vords serving as distractors (Condition HF-LF).

Under this

arrangement, only a facilitating effect due to lARs would be present.
Likewise,

it was expected that condition HF-HF would show the poorest

performance while the other two conditions (LF-HF and LF-LF) would be
i nte nned i ate.
The results of the experiment clearly bore out the predicted
effects.

Underwood and Freund were also careful to point out that the

superior performance in condition HF-LF could not have resulted from
the subjects use of background frequency information (i.e. picking the
high-frequency word in a multiple-choice pair).

If such had been the

case, conditions HF-LF and LF-HF should not have differed significantly,
for

h condition LF-HF, the subjects simply could have reversed this

strategy.
While considerable evidence seems to weigh favorably towards the
view that frequency is the predominant attribute in recognition, it
should be ncted that a frequency discrimination is, of course, not the

(2 I )

only manner

in vJhich a recognition decision can be made.

Two recent

investigations (Hall and Pierce, 1972; Zechmcister and Gude, 1973),
in particular; have shown that the production of lARs may operate in
a fashion somevvhat different from what frequency theory would predict.
In

these experiments, the subjects were asked to study a long 1 ist of

high-frequency words for a subsequent recognition test.
tions,

In some condi-

the subjects were encouraged to produce lARs while in others,

the subjects \vere simply told to repeat the word over and over to
themselves.
Considering the nature of the study lists, it would seem that the
IAR-producing group

~ould

be handicapped in recognition performance for

the distractoJ- items were also high-frequency words.
and

Freund,

(cf. Underwood

1970) Both studies, however, found that the IAR group was

superior to repetition and control subjects.

It was suggested by

Zechmeister and Gude (1973) that the act of making an association,
itself, may serve as a discriminative cue with which a recognition
decision could be made.
remembers

By this, it is meant that the subject actually

that he produced an IAR to a particular study word and this

retention bolsters a discrimination.
Frequency Judgments and Tempora 1 Information
Research which has been identified with the multiple-trace
hypothesis has linked the frequency attribute quite closely to temporal
information.

To restate the hypothesis, frequency serves to increase

the number of independent traces for a particular event which exist
in memory.
various

These traces are temporally marked and by retrieving the

traces, an individual is capable of giving some accounting of

the number of times that an event has occurred.
Hintzman and Waters (1969) provided evidence that the occurrence

i,

''
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of u word in a particulnr list of items is tagged with temporal
information.

In this study, the subjects were presented with two sue-

lists which were either separated in time by a 15 minute interval

cessive

or 1.,rere presented 1.,rith no appreciable interval between the two.

Upon

completion of the study list presentations, the subjects, at varying
int2rvals, were again exposed to study items and asked to place them in
one of the two lists.

Basically, it was discover-ed that as the interval

between study and test increased, this task became progressively more
difficult

in both conditions.

However, when the discrimination judgments

took place during the same experimental session, Hintzman and Waters
found that the subjects were more adept at determining the list to which
a particular item belonged in the situation where a 15 minute interval
had been pI aced betv1een the two 1 is ts.
In another

investigation, Zimmerman and Underwood (1968) rather

strikingly demonstrated the amount of temporal information which a
subject possesses following the presentation of study items.

During

the course of this experiment, the subjects were consecutively presented
with 12 short lists containing 8 to 12 items.
recall
the

period ensued in which the subjects were asked to reproduce only

items

after all
given
told

Following each list, a

in the preceding set.

Two additional tasks were administered

of the lists had been presented.

First, the subjects were

12 cards, each with one of the study lists printed on it, and were

to arrange the cards in the sequence which the 12 study 1 ists had

followed.

In a second task, the subjects were given two items from each

list and asked to judge the ordinal relationship of these items in their
respective lists.
The critical manipulation in this experiment was embodied in
instructions which were given to the subjects prior to the presentation

of any of the study lists.

(2 3)
These instructions differed in the extent to

which they informed the subjects to attend to temporal or ordinal information.

One group was given normi'll free-recall instructions with no

mention

being made that temporal information would later be tested.

other groups were respectively told that word position or word

Tv1o

position and list position would be tested.
Zimmerman and Underwood (1968) found that there were essentially
no differences among the three instruction groups regarding performance
in either the word or list position tasks although accuracy in all
groups was substantial on both measures.

It seems clear from this

study that spatial-temporal information is naturally acquired without
specific instructions to do so and that there is no obvious expense to
an

individual'sability to recall.
As

fully

has already been mentioned, Hintzman and Block (1971) care-

laid out the multiple-trace hypothesis and in so doing made a

crucial connection between a frequency attribute and temporal information
such as that described in the Hintzman and Waters (1969) and Zimmerman
and Underwood

(1968) studies.

Frequency under the multiple-trace

hypothesis is not perceived or encoded directly but is rather inferred
from the number of temporally discriminable traces which can be
retrieved for a particular repeated occurrence.
If freq.Jency judgments are, in fact, determined by temporally
distinguished traces, increasing the temporal discriminability of repeated
occurrences should facilitate a subject's ability to make accurate
judgments of frequency.

One variable which should influence temporal

discrimination is the spacing of item repetitions.

Melton (1970) has

pointed out that spacing the repetitions of items in a free-recall task
enhances the overall number of recalled words as compared to a situation
1111

I'',,
II

I

!I

~

!'

(24)

vJhcre
(1367)

the reretitions occur in a successive manner.

Further, Melton

.:md t1adigan (1969) have found that as the number of items inter-

vening between repetitions increases so too does the performance in
free- reca 11 increase.
If the spacing val-iable influences the retrieval and recall of
v10 rds

in free-recall, it seems reasonable to expect that spacing would

similarily facilitate the retrieval of the time-tagged traces which
Hintzman and Block (1971) imply as the basis of frequency information.
Tvm studies
(1969)

found

indicate that this does appear to be the case.

Hintzman

that as the spacing of repetitions was increased, the

subjects' estimated frequency more closely approximated the actual
frequency with which the words in a study 1 ist had occurred.

A later

study by Hintzman and Block (1970) essentially confirmed these results.
Apparent or perceived frequency does increase with the spacing of
repetitions thus bolstering the position that frequency is dependent
upon temporal information.
Summary and Some Remaining Questions
The frequency-counter notion of Underwood receives some support
from verbal

discrimination and recognition performance.

However,

certain failures of frequency theory, particularly, in regards to the
transfer of frequency units across lists force its proponents to rely on
discrepencies between apparent and actual frequency as explanations for
the anomalous data.

The multiple-trace hypothesis, on the other hand,

is amenable to the findings of most research involved with the nature
of frequency information.

But according to Hintzman and Block (1971),

frequency does not appear to be frequency at all but rather an extension
of

temporal

discriminations.

In any case, a number of questions raised at the outset of this

I

(25)

popcr hilve not been adequately assessed.

Namely, what exactly

constitutes a unit of frequency and if frequency is derived at the time
of test, what type of information is used to infer the frequency with
1hich different types of verbal events h<lVC occurred?

1,

questions

/\]though these

are closely related, an attempt v1ill be made to separately

give each a more detailed consideration.
\tJhat

.!2 ~

Frequency Unit?

In nearlyall of the studies which have been considered, the
stimulus material has been individual words.
therefore,

an

In these experiments,

isolated word is assumed to be the unit of investigation.

It should be remembered, however, that individuals do not typically
encounter

isolated words much less attempt to remember them.

Words

serve as constituent parts of larger language units and therefore
are undoubtedly influenced by the context in which they occur.
Regarding the encoding and representation of frequency, the
question has already been raised as to whether a word is generically
encoded (i.e. in terms of its orthographic properties) or is considered
in terms of its specific semantic properties.

In studies where only

isolated words are presented for study, this consideration becomes
relatively unmportant because there is no reason to assume that different
semantic encodings will occur each time that an item is repeated.
However, when a word can be biased to a number of different meanings
depending
the manner

upon

its context, the question is one of utmost importance if

in which words are encoded is to be understood.

Several investigations have recently provided some understanding
of the effects of context on memory for words.
gated
that

Bobrow (1970) investi-

the reca 1 I of words contained in sentences.

It was hypothesized

if word meanings are remembered then repeating nouns in paraphrased

(26)

sentences which preserved the original meaning of the nouns would result
: n higher
changed

reca 11 than repct it ions of the nouns in sentences which

the meanings of the words.

homographs

To test this hypothesis, Bobrow used

as the critical nouns and included same meaning (SM),

different meaning

(DM), and exact repetition (E) conditions.

At the

time of test, the subject-noun was presented to a subject and recall of
the
in

object~oun

the

S~1

was requested.

The proportion of object-nouns recalled

and E conditions was not significantly different but both

were evidently superior to the condition in which different meaning
repetitions were presented.
Thios (1972) has expanded on these initial findings of Bobrow.
In addition to varying the context in which critical nouns \-Jere repeated
(SM,DM, and E conditions), the repetitions were also varied according
to the number of intervening sentences.

This manipulation of the

spacing of repetitions warrants some explanation.

Madigan (1969) has

suggested that the effect of spacing is to enhance the retrievability
of

repeated

items by providing additional retrieval cues associated with

the different

lists contexts in which the repetitions occur.

By

presenting items in widely disparate portions of a study list, Madigan
maintained that variable encodings of the word would result because the
items would be experienced in the presence of a different set of list
members

and would likely enter into rehearsal strings made up of

different

studyitems.

In addition, Madigan (1969) found that the

spacing effect was eliminated if another cue-word presented along vJith
the to-be-remembered
providing

item was changed at each repetition.

the subjects with these additional retrieval cues at recall

attenuated the facilitative effect of spacing.
word

cues,

Apparently,

Even with these single-

the context of encoding was already suitably different
1
:11

according to Madigan's interpretation.

Thios (1972) anticipated that

(2 7)

semantic context of a sentence would serve simi lari ly if not more
efficiently than a single word as a retrieval cue for the nouns contained
in sentences.
In

this experiment, the spacing effect was eliminated v;hen the

retrieval

cues were changed (i.e. D~1 repetitions).

of nouns

from the DM sentences showed the poorest overall performance.

Hov1ever, the recall

Aithough the DM condition showed a slight advantage over theE condition
at very short lags, theE condition became progressively better as the
number of intervening sentences increased while the DM condition showed
no significantchanges.

The SM condition also displayed a spacing

effect and was superior to the other two conditions across all spacing
lags.

Apparently, maintaining a certain amount of similarity in context

is crucial

for the recall of words whe11 they are presented in the body

of a sentence.
shown

If such were not the case, the DM condition should have

performance more equivalent to the SM condition in, at least, the

short lag sitLations.
Other experiments in which the recall of homographs has been
investigated under varying conditions of spacing have produced somewhat different results.

In these studies, however, the meaning of the

homographs has been biased by simply presenting a single adjective
relevant to one of the various meanings.

Gartman and Johnson (1972),
I

I'

for example,

found that the spacings effect was attenuated by changing

cues but that overall recall was higher when the context cues were varied
than when they were the same. (i.e. the homographs were biased to
different meanings) This finding is, of course, contrary to the results
reported by Thies (1972).
It

is possible, however, that i11cluding vJords in sentences as

~

I

I

(28)

Thies did, causes subjects to pay more attention to the meaning of the
sentence as a whole rather than keying in on the occurrences of particular
words as might be the case in the Gartman and Johnson exrcriment.
ing

Attend-

to the meaning of a \vhole sentence may effectively mask-out the second

occurrence of critical words especially when they are embodied in a sentence expressing a totally new idea.
only

words

tvJo

This would not be the case vJhere

are presented and the subjects may make special note that

the same stimulus word was present but that the .cue word was changed.
Each of these studies in which recall was investigated, nevertheless,

support the conclusion that words are not encoded generically.

recent
was

A

study in which frequency judgments and recognition of homographs

investigated

information.
ranging

is more pertinent to our primary concern with frequency

Rowe (1973) presented homographic words at frequency levels

from 1 to 5 while orthogonally varying the nature of contextual

information.

The repetitions of the homographs were carried out in four

different ways.
that were

In one condition, the homographs were repeated in phrases

intended to bias the same semantic encoding (St·l), wh i 1e in a

second condition,

the repeated phrases were intended to evoke different

semantic encodings (OM).

Two control conditions were included in which

the homographs were either repeated in an isolated fashion (RW) or were
repeated in identical phrases (RP).
asked

All subjects were subsequently

to judge the frequency with which a particular homograph had

occurred.
Rowe clearly found evidence that frequency input is influenced by
semantic context.
in

As would be expected, the various groups did not differ

their judgments when the presented frequency was only one and all of

the conditions showed an increase in perceived frequency as the actual
presented frequency became progressively larger.

The increase in

(29)
frequenc~

perceived
conditions.
vJhere

however, was not identical across the treatment

The best estimates of frequency were made in condition RW

the homographs vJere repeated in an isoluted fashion.

In the

conditions 1·1here the homographs were embedded in the context of a ph rase,
~dgments

frequency
Jess

suffered as the context of the homographs became

similar during the successive repetitions of the phrases.

exact

The

phrase repetitions were most conducive to the judgment of

frequency while the SM repetitions showed a significant advantage over
the DM repetitions.
that

frequency
While

Rowe 1 s findings undoubtedly allow the conclusion

input is specific to the semantic encoding of a word.

it appears evident that the perceived frequency of words is

influenced by semantic context, all of these studies varying the semantic
encoding of homographs have still implicitly assumed that an individual
word

is the basic unit of frequency.

Semantic context does p reduce

differential results in recall depending upon whether a homograph is
presented with a single word cue or embedded In the context of a meaningful

sentence.

Likewise, frequency judgments are differentially affected

depending upon whether the judged words are presented alone or in a
phrase context.

In reca 11, it has been suggested that the d i screpent

li

1,
I

findings

are the result of different word processing strategies in the

two experimental

situations.

In particular, sentences may be vie1.ved as

intact units expressing a unitary idea rather than as a mere composite
of

individual words that are noted and stored independently.

frequency
v1here
itself,

~dgments,

For

it is reasonable to suggest that under conditions

intact sentences are presented for study, it is the sentence,
and not the individual word which is the unit of frequency.

Information about specific words may be merely incidental in such a task.
There appears to be only one study in which frequency judgments on

Iii

sentences

(30)

have been attempted.

Jacoby (1972) presented his subjects with a series of sentences
and

1ater required frequency judgments on either intact sentences or the

subject-nouns found in the sentences.
repeated
with

under varying conditions; some of the sentences were repeated

the subject-noun intact but with a different synonomous adjective

and verb
nouns

During study, the sentences were

in each repetition, others were repeated with intact subject-

but completely different modifiers (i.e. adjective and verb), and

a final

condition contained exact repetitions of the original sentences.

In addition, the number of items intervening between the repetitions
(0, 3, and 11) and the frequency of presentation were orthogonally
combined

i th the types of repetition.

\AJ

One general finding of Jacoby 1 s is particularly relevant to the
suggestion made above that a sentence as a whole may be the relevant unit
of frequency.

In the case of exact repetitions, the frequency judgments

of sentences were more accurate than those of the subject-nouns.
result

im~

This

ies that the sentence is, indeed, the relevant unit for

frequency estimation when meaningful sentences are presented for study.
If such were not the case, there wou 1d be no reason to expect the
frequency of the whole sentences and the subject-nouns to differ in the
exact
were

repetition condition for their actual frequencies of presentation
identical.
Looking specifically at the sentence judgments, Jacoby found

that the subjects were quite efficient in detecting slight modifications
in

the \"Jord i ng of the sentences and thus avoiding confusions with

sentences

containing synonomous modifiers.

The fact that frequency

judgments were 1 ittle affected by the similarily worded versions is
indicative of this basic result.

In the same vein, the sentences which

( 31 )

were followed by similar repetitions were not judged differently from
the sentences with completely different repetitions.
slightest

change

Apparently, the

in wording made it possible to discriminate the

original sentences from their modified repetitions.
These results are somev-1hat surprising in light of a number of
investigations which have assessed memory for sentences in both recall
and

recognition paradigms.

Sachs (1967) and Begg (1971) have respect-

ively shown that primarily semantic rather than syntactic information
is
out

retained
that

which

in long-term recognition and recall.

These studies point

it is the general meaning as opposed to the specific wording

is

remembered.

(1971)

has

in all

situations.

However, another study by Bregman and Strasberg

indicated that this generalization does not necessarily hold
These latter authors have demonstrated that subjects,

when pressed to do so, are capable of remembering specific wording
information.
for

this

The subjects in Jacoby 1 s experiment were, of course, presseJ

type of information and the simple constant structure of the

experimental sentences may have made wording information relatively easy
to

remember.

It will be of interest to discover whether or not

frequency information regarding the occurrence of similar sentences
expressing the same semantic content is also present in memory.
How Is

Frequency Derived?
Jacoby (1972) has maintained that frequency of presentation is

derived at the time of test rather than encoded as an attribute of
memory during study.

This position is, of course, consistent with the

multiple-trace hypothesis.
temporal

11

Hintzman and Block (1971) have considered a

tag 11 discriminating the repeated occurrences of an item as the

principal means by which frequency information is retrieved.

Other

researchers who have adopted the multiple-trace hypothesis have presented

a somev1hat different vievJ regarding the identificCJtion of the
differentiating tags.
postulated

(32)

And0rson and Bower (1972), for example, have

the existence of

11

list markers 11 which link an event 1 s

occurrence to a set of contextual elements.

These 1 ist markers are

presumed to bring into play information of a temporal sort, as well as
information pertinent to other events which have immediately preceded and
followed the event in question, and to subjective feelings of an individual
(i.e. boredom) which might have been experienced at the time which a
particular event occurred.

Rowe (1973) has also supported the derived

view of frequency and has suggested that his research with homographs
marks

the semantic encoding of an item as a possible dimension along

\"lhich

frequency information can be derived.
Jacoby (1972) has, in some respects, shown that when the stimulus

materials are

identical, frequency judgments of different types

(in his experiment, sentence vs. noun judgments) will be made and
influenced along those dimensions of the stimulus material which are
relevant

to the type of judgment being requested.

Considering the

judgments of sentence frequency, the spacing of repetitions (i.e. a
temporal attribute) was a facilitating variable in estimating frequency
of occur renee for on 1y those sentences which had i dent i ca 1 repetitions.
(Jacoby, 1972)

In this situation where repetitions are exact, a temporal

tag such as that proposed by Hintzman and Block (1971) appears to be an
efficient manner in which to derive frequency.

Hith the similar and

different modifier repetitions, however, it has already been pointed out
that any change in wording was sufficient to discriminate the repeated
occurrences of the sentences and thus the spacing variable is not
operative.
On the other hand, the frequency judgments for nouns were

'I'~
(33)

influenced by spacing regardless of the type of modifiers.

While the

subjects were not completely accurate in their frequency judgments,
they were,

nevertheless, sensitive to the repetitions of nouns in

differently worded sentences but at the same time were capable of
detecting

the dissimilarity of the sentences.

As Jacoby has pointed

out,

to consider frequency as an encoded attribute v/ould necessitate

that

an

sentences
sentence
the
in

index be maintained for the occurrence of particularly worded
as v1ell as an index for a particular word regardless of its
context.

The preferred interpretation was, of course, that

abi 1 i ty to judge the frequency of both sentences and words viewed
the same stimulus material is largely a matter of deriving the

information at the time of test on the basis of task instructions and
the

retrieval

of cues which allov.J the judgments to be carried out in

the mast efficient manner.

I

L
:Ill

THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT
Recent research has provided a number of insights concerning the
representation of frequency in memory.
shovm

For example, Howe (1973) has

that the perceived frequency of a homograph is influenced by the

manner

in which semantic context biases encoding of meaning.

Jacoby

(1972)

has also demonstrated that the frequency judgments of nouns are

influenced by the type of sentences in which nouns are included.
Additionally, Jacoby (1972) has found that the frequency of entire sentences can be somewhat adequate 1y assessed.
reasonable to ask the question
than

the question

11

11

Perhaps, it is more

what can be a frequency unit'' rather

what is a frequency unit. 11

While Jacoby (1972) has presented evidence indicating that the
repetitiveness of a sentence can be accurately judged, it is not
possible to conclude that these judgments were made on the basis of the
semantic content of the sentence as a who 1e.
followed

The fact that sentences

bysynonomous repetitions wer-e judged no higher than sentences

followed by completely different repetitions (i.e. the noun was the
same but the modifiers had different meanings) indicates that sentence
judgments

in Jacoby's experiment were made on the basis of the actual

physical presence or absence of the modifying words.

It is obvious,

hmvever, that people do not remember exactly what they hear or see.
(Sachs, 1967; Begg, 1971)
Therefore, the present experiment addresses itself to two basic
issues.
which

First, is it possible to adequately assess the frequency with
the semantic content of a sentence has been expressed without

(34)

(35)

reference
Second,

to the actual words in which that idea has been stated?
if meaning or semantic content can be judged, wi II the spacings

of meanings

facilitate frequency j udgrnents of sernant i c content in a

manner similar to the facilitation found by the spacing of vJords or
intact sentences?

In short, is it reasonable to speak of the frequency

of sentence meaning?
Specifically, the subjects in the present experiment were presented
with a series of simple active declarative sentences in which a
critical

set were repeated in either an exact or a paraphrased form.

Paraphrases were constructed by substituting synonyms for all content
words.

11

For example,

the huge pol iceman halted the expensive auto-

mobile 11 would be rephrased as
car . 11

11

the large cop stopped the high-priced

Consensus that a sentence and its paraphrase did express the

same content was obtained by asking a group of subjects to rate the
degree of semantic similarity existing between a pair of sentences.
Only

those sentences which were judged to be highly similar were

subsequently included in the experimental 1 ists.
All subjects viewed the series of sentences under general memory
instructions.

Following study, however, groups of subjects were given

different instructions regarding the type of frequency judgments which
they were to make.

In one condition, the subjects were asked to judge

the number of times that a sentence had occurred during study in the
exact

form

(i.e. same wording) shown on the test sheet.

A second group

of subjects was instructed to judge the frequency with which the
particular meaning expressed by a test sentence had occurred regardless
of

the exact wording.

must

In order to perform this task, the subjects

ignore the particular words comprising a sentence and focus on the

semantic content.

(36)

Performance in this second condition is of importance in two
specific

respects.

First, if the frequency judgments of meaninos can be

reasonably accomplished, this will
reported

on yet another dimension of the stir1ulus material.

(1972)

has

worded

sentences

finding

content

Jacoby

already demonstrated that the frequency of specificallyand the occurrences of nouns in different sentences

be derived from the same study presentations.

can
a

indicate that frequency can be

Additionally, such

would be consistent with research indicating that semantic

is

the primary component of long-term memory for sentences.

Secondly, the role of the spacing of repetitions in the meaning
judgment
frequency
for

condition

is a I so of importance in supporting a notion that

is derived on the basis of whatever dimensions are relevant

the type of judgments being requested.

ment,

In Jacoby's (1972) experi-

it was found that spacing was only effective for exact repetitions

of experimental

sentences.

Any change in wording was sufficient to

discriminate a similarly worded repetition from the original sentence
and

thus

frequency judgments were not influenced by the simi Jar

repetitions regardless of the level of spacing.
ment,

hovvever,

In the present experi-

a difference in wording is not a relevant dimension for

discriminating paraphrased sentences when meaning judgments are requested.
It

is

expected that spacing wi II facilitate the judgments of frequency

in

the meaning judgment regardless of whether a sentence is repeated

in

an exact or paraphrased form.

Spacing under these circumstances will

always provide a relevant temporal cue for the determination of
frequency.

This finding would provide considerable support for a

position maintainhg that frequency is derived on the basis of whatever
dimensions are pertinent fo1· the task at hand.

t1ETHOD

Materials.

Sixty sentences were employed during the actual

experiment, each having a constant syntactical frame.

Thirty-six of

these sentences were essential to the experimental manipulations
(critical sentences); 14 sentences served as filler items in the study
lists

(filler sentences); and 9 sentences were not seen until the time

of test (neht sentences).

For each critical sentence, a paraphrased

version was constructed by substituting synonyms for all content words
(i.e. adjectives, nouns, and verbs) while maintaining the same syntactic
structure.

Roget's Thesarus of the English Language and the Funk and

Wagnall 's Standard
used

Handbook~

in selecting synonyms.

Synonyms, Antonyms,

an~

Prepositions were

The 36 critical sentences and their

paraphrases were selected from a larger set of synonomous pairs which had
been

rated by a group of 20 Ss for their degree of semantic similarity.

A five-point scale was used for these ratings:

5-exactly the same in

meaning; 4-very similar in meaning; 3-similar in meaning; 2-different in
meaning; I-very different in meaning.

A number of sentence pairs

expressing divergent content were included in the to-be-rated set to
ensure that the entire range of the scale would be employed by the

~s.

Those 36 pairs receiving the highest ratings of semantic similarity were
subsequently included in the experimental manipulations.

No two sentences

(i.e. critical sentences, their paraphrases, filler sentences, or new
sentences) had any content words in common.

In order to control for the

imagery value of the sentences, the 36 critical sentences (only the
original version) were submitted to four independent judges for rating on
(37)

(38)

concreteness.
imagine;
to

l1-easy to imagine; 3-fairly difficult to imagine; 2-difficult

imagine;

grouped
lists;

Again, a five-point scale was used: 5-very easy to

I-very difficult to imagine.

into 3 sets of 12 sentences for control purposes in the study
representing high, medium and lov..r levels of concreteness.
Desiqn and Procedure.

----·- -- - - - ·

II ·:.1"

Visual presentation of the sentences was

Each subject received a deck of 3X5 inch cards with one sentence

used.
typed

The 36 sentences were then

per card.

Prior to study, all Ss were given the follovJing

instructions:
This experiment is concerned with your memory
for sentences. During the series of sentences
which you will be asked to study, some of the
sentences will be repeated and some of the
sentences will have very similar meanings.
The Ss were then paced through their deck of cards at a rate of

7 seconds per card.
critical

Within a study deck, the frequency with which the

sentences were presented was varied.

presented

There were 18-once-

(lP) and 18 twice-presented (2P) sentences.

2P sentences, two additional factors were manipulated:

Regarding the
the type of

senter~ce repetition (identical or paraphrased) and the number of other

sentences

interveningbetween the repetitions of a 2P sentence (spacing

I, I'

I

!;!
I

of 0, 4 and 8 sentences).

6 types of 2P sentences.
within a study deck.
three

times

Combination of these factors resu 1ted in
There were three ins lances of each type

Additionally, a number of sentences were repeated

in order to increase the Ss 1 range of possible responses.

Following study, the Ss were presented with test sheets of
sentences.

Testing instructions were varied between subjects.

One-half of the Ss received instructions which stressed that frequency
·judgments of the sentences were to be made only on the basis of the
specific wording of the test sentences (Condition JOW).

1 I

The instructions

vJere

(39)

as follows:

Tl>e sheets ~vh i ch have been honded-out to you
contain a 1 ist of sentences. Some of these
sentences were included in the deck of cards
which you have just studied; others you have
not seen. You are asked to judge the number
of times which you saw each of the sentences
during study. Your judgments may range from
0 to 3. Be sure to judqe only the number of
times that you have seen the sentence exactly
as it is worded on the test sheets given to
you.
The other one-ha 1f of the Ss received a second set of instructions
\'Jh i ch emphasized that the frequency judgments be made on the basis
of

the content or meaning of the sentences.

These

(Condition JOM)

instructions were stated in the following manner.
The sheets which have been handed-out to you
contain a 1 ist of sentences. Some of these
sentences were included in the deck of cards
which you have just studied; others you have
not seen. You are asked to judge the number
of times that the idea or meaning expressed
in each sentence occurred in the study deck
regardless of the exact manner in which it
was worded. Your judgments may range from
0 to 3. Remember that your judgments are to
be made on the idea or meaning of the sentence and not on the exact wording.

Examples of appropriate frequency judgment procedures for the two tasks
were given to the respective instructional groups.
TvJO control

unmixed with

groups were included in which the study decks were

respect to the repetitions of the 2P sentences.

In one

control group, the repetitions of the 2P sentences were always
identical
control

in form and JOW instructions were given.

group,

In the second

the repetitions of the 2P sentences were always

paraphrased and JOM instructions were given.

The study and test

instructions given to the control groups were slightly modified
(i.e.

the first control group wcJs not told to expect different

sentences with similar meanings etc.) and the spacir1g of repetitions

v<:~ried

v!iJS

in both control groups.

Study_
A primacy

/'>.study deck consisted of 79 card presentations.

and recency buffer, respectively, occupied ordinal positions

to 8 and
one 2P

Dec~.:

72 to 79.

v/ithin each buffer, there 1r1ere three lP sentences,

sentence, and one 3P sentence (the 2P and 3P sentences

repeated in identical form).
decks.

The

central

\·Jet·e

The buffers were constant across all study

portion of a study deck \vas divided into three

blocks of 21 sentences.

Each block was composed of six lP sentences,

six 2P sentences (representing a 11 six of the 2P sentence types), and
a 3P filler sentence which was repeated in an identical form.
block,

two of the lP sentences represented each of the three levels of

concreteness.
vJithin

Within a

the

There was one sentence from each level of concreteness

three instances of a given 2P sentence type.

Additionally,

the six 2P sentences in a given block were equally divided among the
three concreteness levels.

Each block followed a completely different

order of sentence-type presentations.
The 36 critical sentences functioned as both lP sentences and as
the

six 2P sentence types during the course of the experiment.

necessitated that 12 different study decks be formed.

This

Eighteen critical

sentences first served as lP sentences while the other 18 served as
2P

sentences.

Groups of three 2P sentences were then systematically

rotated

through

the six 2P sentence types producing six different

decks.

The designation of lP and 2P sentences was then reversed and

the

same procedure was followed with six more decks resulting.

While

the

position of the sentence types within a block remained constant

throughout the experiment, the blocks, themselves, were rearranged in
three different manners (i.e. B-1, B-2, B-3; B-3, B-1, B-2, and B-2, B-3,
B-1).

The position of sentence types in the study decks was partially

( 41 )
controlled by presenting four of the different study decks under these
three block or-ders.
The study decks for the control conditions were similar in that
the buffers,

the filler items, and the division of the central portion

of the deck into blocks were maintained.

In the case of 2P sentences,

there were two instances of each spacing level vJithin a given block of
sentences.

Tvvo critical sentences from each level of concreteness were

included among the six 2P sentences in a block.

Six different study

decks were needed for each critical sentence to serve in all of the
sentence types

(lP sentences and three spacings of 2P sentences).

These

decks were formed by rotating groups of six critical sentences through
the different sentence types via the procedures described above.
Again,

the position of the sentence types was partially controlled by

rearranging the block orders in three different manners.

Two study decks

were studied under each of the three different orders.
Test Booklets.

The booklets were composed of three sheets of

paper with 16 sentences typed per sheet.

Each page included six lP

sentences, six 2P sentences, one 3P filler sentence taken from the
central portion of the study decks, and three new sentences.
sentences

Two

fromeach level of concreteness were included among the six

l P sentences on a page.

In addition, all six types of 2P sentences

were found on a given page.

In the control conditions, two instances

of each 2P type were found per page.

Order of test i terns v1as

randomized on each sheet of the test booklet.

Paraphrased 2P sentences

were always· tested by presenting the arbitrarily designated original
critical sentence during test.
Subjects.

A total of 128 introductory psychology students at

Loyola University served as Ss.

Participation partially fulfilled a

coLn·se requi rerncnt.

Twenty Ss served in the initial rating procedure.

The remaining 108 Ss were randomly assigned upon anivnl nt the
experimental room to one of the between Ss

1

treatment or control

groups.

In the experimental conditions, the treatment groups were

formed

by combining the two types of test instructions (JOW and JOM)

v;ith

the

groups
six

12 different study decks.

In the control conditions, the

were formed by combining the two test instructions with the

study decks.

ueatment

Ss were tested in groups of three under the same

conditions.

Thus, 36 Ss served in each experimental

instruction condition and 18 Ss served in each control instruction
condition.

I

RESULTS
Hixed List Conditions
An
Type of

initial

three-woy analysis of variance (Instructions X

Item X Sentence Concreteness) indicated that the concreteness

1eve 1 of the sentences produced no main effect and did not enter into
any

interactions with other experimental variables.

Therefore, the

mean judged frequency for once-presented (lP), twice-presented (2P-S),
and paraphrased

items (2P-P) in the

tv·JO

instructional conditions (JOW

and JOM) have been collapsed over the levels of concreteness and are
shown

in Table 1.

The means indicate that

~

displayed differential

performance depending upon the type of test instructions which they
received.

When frequency judgments were requested for the exact wording

of the sentences, the 2P-P i terns were judged in a manner simi 1a r to the
judgments made on the 1P i terns.
judged
on

A1ternat i ve 1y, the 2P-P i terns were

like 2P-S items when Ss were asked to make frequency estimates

the basis of the general meaning expressed by the sentences.
This description of performance was statistically analyzed by a

series of orthogonal planned comparisons performed on the simple effects
of

Item Type (lP, 2P-S, 2P-P) in the two instructional groups.

For Ss

making judgments of sentence wording, the judged frequency of lP and
2P-P items did not differ significantly, but the weighted comparison
between

lP and 2P-P items vs. 2P-S items was highly significant, F(l, 70)

= 194.48, £<·001.
condition JOM.

Two planned comparisons were also performed for

The first comparison indicated that mean judged frequency

for 2P-S and 2P-P items did not differ significantly while the second
comparison found that the judged frequency of lP items was significantly

TABlE
IV~ean

Frequency

Mixed

Judgrnents

JOW

in

list Conditions

TYPE OF

TEST

1

1P
zasau

ITEIVi

2P-P

2P-S

.9 2 4

1.4 8 1
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.8 4 4
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1.1"-0

I
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0

~
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1.0.:>0

J

(It:> )
different

from frequency judgment performance for the 2P- S and 2P- P

items, .£(2, 70)
of

==

226.lf3, p_(.OOl.

In sum, the ~s \-Jere quite capable

performing two types of frequency judgment tasks following study

under

i dent i ca 1 conditions.

means

One additional

point, however, needs to be made regarding the

shown

1.

in

Tab 1e

The Ss tested under JOM instructions tended to

produce generally higher estimates of frequency than Ss tested under
JOW

instructions.

the

two test instructions under optimal performance should both lead

to

the same

and

This observation is true for lP and 2P-S items where

frequencyestimates.

Comparison of the means in the first

third columns of Table 1 makes this tendency clear.

analyses

for

Simple effects

Instructions statistically confirm the higher frequency

in the JOM condition for both the lP items, £..(1, 70) = 31.16,

judgments

E.. (.001 and the 2P-S items, f..(l, 70)

= 4.27, .e_(.Ol.

The tendency for higher frequency estimates in Condition JOM
is

reflected in ~s

also

1

performance on sentences presented only at the

time of test (not-presented or NP items).
(i.e.

The false-alarm rates

the proportion of total responses to NP sentences that were 1 or

greater) were 12.6% for Condition JOM and 5.8% for Condition JOW.

The

corresponding mean judged frequencies were . 19 in Condition JOM and .06
in

Condition JOW.

for

NP

items failed to reach statistical significance.
In

frequency
analyzed
Type of
This

However, !_-test performed on mean frequency judgments

order to assess the role of the spacing of item repetitions,
estimates

for the 2P-S and 2P-P sentences were further

in a 2 X 2 X 3 X 3 analysis of variance (Instruction X
Repetition X Sentence Concreteness X Spacing of Repetitions).

analysis

produced significant main effects for Instructions

(JO\>J or JOM), f_(l, 70 = fi3.70, for the Type of Repetition
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FIGURE 1. Frequency Judgment Performance For 2P-S and 2P-P
Sentences in the Mixed List Conditions.

(4 7)
Unmixed List Conditions
In the unmixed list conditions, the Concreteness of the study
sentences

agoin entered into no significant sources of va1·iation

in any of the <1na lyses performed.
of

this variable v;i 11 be 1n3de.

Therefore, no further mention

Frequency judgment perfo1·mance in the

JOW and JOM condition was analyzed separately.

In both conditions,

Frequency of Presentation (lP and 2P) produced a significant main effect;
for Condition JOW, ~(1, 17)
1117.75

==

76.84 and for Condition JOM, ~(1, 17) =

(both E_ 1 s( .001).
Performance on the NP sentences was quite comparable in the two

instructional groups.

The false-alarm rates were 5.5% for Condition

JOW and 4% for Condition JOM. A .!_-test performed on the mean judged
frequencies for NP items proved nonsignificant, l(70) = 1.74, £. (. 10.
Figure 2 illustrates the mean frequency judgments made by the
instructional groups for lP and 2P items at each of three levels at which
sentences

repetitionswere spaced (0, 4 and 8).

It should be remembered

that twice-presented items in Condition JOW were repeated in the same
form

(2~5)

while the twice-presented items in Condition JOM consisted

of an original sentence followed by a paraphrased version (2P-P).
two unmixed

The

1 ist conditions were comparable, however, in terms of the

number of lP and 2P (either 2P-S or 2P-P) items in the study lists.
Inspection of Figure 2 shows that frequency judgments in Condition JOW
increased

from 0 spacing to

changed at spacing level 8.
first

4 spacing and then remained relatively unIn Condition JOM, however, judged frequency

increased and then decreased across the different spacing levels.

The amount of increase from 0 spacing to

4 spacing was considerably

larger in Condition JOW than in Condition JOM (l .35 to 1.94 for Condition
J0\<1 vs.

1. 72 to 1. 85 for Condition J01'1).
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FIGURE 2.

Frequency Judgment Performance in the Unmixed Lists.

(Same or Paraphrosed), F(l, 70)
Repetitions (0,
ally,

l-1,

= 70.7.8, and for the Spacing of

or 8), :_(2, 140)

a siqnificant

lr~truction

=

17.86 (all .e_'s (.001).

Addition-

by Repetition Type interaction, :_(1, 70)

31.38 and a significant Repetition Type by Spacing interaction, [(2,140)
46.58, v1ere found (both E.'s (. 00 I).
The Instruction by Repetition Type interaction can be attributed
to the differential performance displayed in the two instructional
groups

for 2P-P sentences.

in Table 1.
JO\.J

The nature of the interaction can be seen

The 2P-P sentences were treated as lP items in Condition

and as 2P-S items in Condition JOM.
Figure 1 shows the mean judged frequency for the two repetition

types

(2P-S and 2P-P) at the different levels of spacing in both

Condition

~Wand

JOM.

The Repetition Type by Spacing interaction is

ref] ected

in the fact that 2P-S sentences resu 1ted in higher frequency

judgments at the longer lags in both instructional conditions, while
the 2P-P sentences showed no effect due to spacing in either Condition
JOW or JOM.
judged as

This observation is true a 1though the 2P-P sentences were

IP sentences in Condition JOW and as 2P-S sentences in

Condition JOM. The three-way interaction of Instructions X Repetition
Type X Spacing was not significant.
Simple effects of Spacing for the 2P-S items collapsed over
instruction groups indicates significant variation due to the level of
spacing, [{2, 140) = 39.57, .e_ (.001.
means

Newman-Keuls tests performed on the

for each spacing level indicate that levels 4 and 8 are sig-

nificantly higher than the 0 level but do not differ between themselves
(significant .e_'s< .05).

The simple effects analysis for spacing showed

no significant effect on the performance for 2P-P sentences \>Jhere the
second occurrence of an item was a synonomous version of the first
occurrence.

(50)

Statistical confirmation of this description of Figure 2 is
provided
of

by two 3 X 3 (Spacing X Concreteness) within-subject analyses

variance.

The analysis performed for Condition JOW produced a

significant main effect due to the level of spacing, ~(2, 3~)
Individual
were

conducted

judged

=

13.50,

comparisons among the means at each spacing level

using the Newman-Keuls procedure.

It was found that the

frequency at spacing levels~ and 8 did not differ significantly

but was substantially higher than the judged frequency at the 0 spacing
level

(significant p_ 1 s(.05).

variation

in the frequency judgments could be attributed to the in-

f 1 uence of spacing.

l
l
I
I

For Condition JOM, no significant

DISCUSSION
The pattern of results obtained in the present experiment
provide t\vo significant findings regarding frequency judgment
performance with sentence material.

First, it has been shown that

reliable frequency information can be reported along the dimensions
of either the exact wordings or the basic
Second,

11

gists 11 of study sentences.

frequency estimates for paraphrased sentences in Condition JOM

demonstrates a situation in which the facilitative effects of distributed
repetitions fails to occur although the two synonomous sentences are
~vidently

viewed

in conjunction by those Ss making judgments of sen-

tence meaning.
In the present study, the Ss were given sentences for study but
were not told until the time of test what the nature of the impending
test would be.
that

Performance by

~s

in the JOM condition clearly indicates

the frequency of some abstract representation of sentence 1 s

meaning can be assessed even when the manner of phrasing the meaning
varies markedly at each occurrence.

In this experiment, two synonomous

versions of the same basic meaning were properly seen as a twiceoccurring event when

~s

were told to make their frequency judgments on

the basis of the study sentences underlying meaning without regard to
the specific wording.

On the other hand, Ss in Condition JO\o/ were quite

capable of discriminating twice-presented (2P-S) and paraphrased (2P-P)
sentences when the test instructions placed emphasis on the judgment of
a sentence 1 s exact wording.

Under these conditions, the paraph rased

items were treated in a manner similar to once-presented sentences.
These results would necessitate that an index for a sentence 1 s

(51 )

,I
I

(52)
exact wording and an
sentence's
is

ind~x

for some abstract representation of the

meaning ivould have to be maintained if frequency information

directly encoded into memory as is asserted by Underwood (1969).

short,

the Ss must necessarily perform a summing operation along tvm

dimensions of
That
for

In

the study sentences (i.e. the wordings and the meanings).

such operations might be carried out does not seem unreasonable
the Ss were told prior to study that some sentences would be re-

peated
ivould

in

identical form while in other cases two different sentences

be similar in meaning.

The tvm salient dimensions of the sentence

material, therefore, were made relatively clear.
The spacing of sentence repetitions has resulted in consistent

Ij

findings

in

the mixed and unmixed 1 ist conditions of the present study.

When the study sentences were repeated in identical form, frequency
judgments much more c I ose I y approximated the actual presented frequency
when

the two occurrences of the sentence:, were sepat a led by el the( 4

or 8 intervening items than if the two repetitions came in immediate
succession.

This facilitative effect of spacing for 2P-S sentences was

observed

in Conditions JOW and JOM for both mixed and unmixed study

lists.

It should be noted that a normal "spacing effect" implies that

frequency
between

judgments should become progressively higher as the lag

the two repetitions becomes larger.

In the present study,

frequency judgments for 2P-S items did not increase beyond the
However,

spacing.
reached

at

responses

4

level of

it may be suggested that a "ceiling" level was

spacing level 4 due to the restricted range of possible
available

in this experiment.

For the paraphrased sentences, no spacing effect was found;
even

in Condition JOM where the 2P-P items were treated as twice-

occurring

events.

In the unmixed 1 ist conditions, the Ss making

(53)

judQments of sentence meaning did nppear to be influenced to some
extent
noted

by the lag between the tvm synonomous sentences.
that frequency judgments did increase from the 0 to

of spacing.
at

It rnay be

4 levels

Hm·1ever, the frequency judgments for paraphrased sentences

spacing level 8 dropped below the performance shown at the 0 level

and none of

the differences among the lags were found to be significant.

In mixed list conditions, judged frequency for paraphrased sentences was
virtually
These

identical

results

played

at the three levels of spacing in Condition JOM.

indicate that the lag between paraphrased sentences

little or no role in the frequency judgments made on this type of

study item.

I

One additional aspect of the present results warrants some interpretation.

While the findings of this experiment clearly indicate that

I

both the wording and the meaning of study sentences can be adequately

I

judgment of meaning and the judgment of wording tasks are of equal

I

{

assessed,

the question may st i 11 be raised as to whether or not the

difficulty.
(1970)

Studies such as those conducted by Sachs (1967) and Begg

would suggest that general meaning as opposed to the exact

wording of sentences would more likely be remembered.

In terms of the

present experiment, such findings would imply that the judgments of
sentence meaning should more closely approximate the actual presented
frequency of meanings than the judgments of sentence wording should
approximate the actual occurrence of specifically worded sentences.
In the mixed I ist conditions of this study, the JOM instructions
did,

in fact, tend to produce generally higher frequency judgments

than Condition JOW.

l

L

This tendency is reflected in the mean frequency

judgments for NP, lP, and 2P-S sentences where the two instructions
under optimal

performance would result in the same judgments.

In terms

(5h)
the ''surnned'' or encoded view of frequency, this finding vJOuld imply

of
that

the Ss employed different criteria in r·cporting their- stored

frequency

information depending upon the test requirements.

These

observations, however, must be interpreted with caution because the
overall means for once-presented (1.09) and twice-presented (1.73)
sentences were

identical for the JOM and JOW conditions in the unmixed

1 is ts.
The
mixed
tial

I

l

frequency judgments for the JOM condition in the

lists might be more parsimoniously explained in terms of differenresponse biases in the two instructional conditions which were

built

l

higher

into the experimental design.

demands

required

In the JOW condition, the task

that three-fourths of the experimental sentences be

ca 11 ed once-occurring wh i 1e the demands for appropriate performance in
the JOM condition specified that only one-half of the experimental
sentences

be judged as once-presented.

These differences in response

probabilities were not present in the unmixed lists.
In order to test this possible explanation for the higher
frequency

judgments

conducted

for

This
types

analysis
of

according
of

in Condition JOM, a testing effects analysis was

the frequency judgments made in the mixed 1 ist conditions.
considered the frequency judgments for the different

items (lP, 2P-S, and 2P-P) in the two instruction groups
to whether they occurred in the first, second or third portion

the test list.

Thus, the position in the test list at which the

sentences were presented was taken into account.

If the response bias

described above were actually operating, it would be expected that the
judgments

in Condition JOM should become higher in each third of the

list

and

the judgments in Condition JO\.J l01ver in each portion of the

test

1 ist as the differential response probabilities became apparent

(55)

to the Ss.
The testing effects analysis, however, found no main effect for
position nor any interaction of position with either the instruction
groups or the type of item.
are

Therefore, the results of this experiment

in agreement with the finding of Sachs (1967) and Begg (1971) that

the meaning rather than the wording of sentences is the more likely
display of memory for sentence material.

The failure to find an

overall difference in frequency judgments between Conditions JOW and
I

JOM

in the unmixed lists may be attributed to the fact that in these

I'

conditions, the ~s were presented with only one type of repetition
I

in

the study lists.

both

As compared to the mixed list conditions where

types of repetitions were presented, performance with the unmixed

lists most probably constituted an easier task in which frequency
information would only be summed or encoded along one dimension
(i.e. wording or meaning) of the study sentences.
While the results of the present experiment have been considered
in light of an encoded view of frequency, Jacoby (1972) has suggested
an alternative position regarding frequency information.

In his study,

sentences were also presented for study under neutral instructions.

I~

At the time of test, Jacoby's

were asked to judge either the

frequency of the intact sentences or the frequency of subject-nouns
contained

j

~s

in the sentences.

In some cases, the subject-nouns were

repeated in identical sentence frames, while in other cases, subjectnouns were repeated in different sentence frames.

Like the present

experiment, Jacoby (1972) discovered that ~s were fairly accurate in
reporting

frequency information on both dimensions (i.e. sentences and

nouns).

In interpreting this finding, Jacoby maintained that frequency

information is not directly entered into memory but is rather derived

~

I

II! I

ii

at the ti111e of test on the basis of contextu<3l inform<:Jtion.
for

Jacoby can be classified as of

referring

tvJO

Context

(56)

basic types; temporal context

to the point in the study list at which a given event

occurred and semantic context referring to either the sentences immediately
preceding and fol lm·Jing a given sentence or to the sentence frame in

I

'

i

!

,
1.
,:!:

which a given subject-noun occurred.

'I,'

I

Jacoby (1972) maintained that the occurrences of both sentences
and nouns

result in independent traces as the Hintzman and Block (1971)

multiple-trace hypothesis would suggest and that further, the different
occurrences of an item result in traces which are in some way marked
for both the temporal and semantic context in which they occurred.
At the time of test, aS would then retrieve the different traces
requested by task instructions.

The extent to which the independent

traces of a given event overlapped in contextual features would then
dictate a S's success in estimating frequency along different dimensions
of the study material (either nouns or sentences in the Jacoby study).
Howe (1973) has provided a more detailed analysis of the derived view

l

I

L

of frequency based on contextual feature tagging.
While context undoubtedly may influence frequency judgment
performance such as that found in the Jacoby study, it does not
seem reasonable to deny that a S wi 11 ever sum events of different
types

during study.

Jacoby (1972) has argued that the encoded view of

frequency would necessitate that frequency information in his study
must
in

be stored for each sentence and additionally, for each word found

the sentences regardless of the particular sentence frames in which

they occurred.

His conclusion was that such an analysis of frequency

information would "soon become unwieldy."

Nonetheless, it is possible

that Ss may sum frequency along a number of particularly salient

(57)

dimensions of the study material os has been suggested for the findings
of the present experiment.
tence
in

Subject-nouns along with the intact sen-

units appear to be likely candidates for the salient dimensions

the Jacoby (1972) study.

It is unlikely that the Ss in the Jacoby

experiment would have been so successful in reporting the frequency of
less

essential words found in the sentences such as adjectives or

articles.
(and

The position taken here is that frequency may be summed

thus encoded) along a number of salient dimensions found in

study material
a~

and necessarily derived along any other dimensions which

does not view as salient during study.

The number of salient

dimensions along which frequencies can be summed at any one time remains
a question for future investigation.
Jacoby (1972) has also considered the role of spacing in
frequency judgment processes.

Basi call y, Jacoby discovered that

spacing effects were markedly apparent when the to-be-judged events
were
nouns

repeated
repeated

in identical fashion (i.e. the intact sentences and subjectin the same sentence frames) and considerably reduced

when the context of the to-be-judged events varied at each repetition
(i.e.
are,

subject~ouns

repeated in different sentence frames).

These results

of course, not unlike the influence of spacing found in the present

research;
repeated

clear spacing effects were only present for those sentences
in

identical fashion.

The role of spacing must then be con-

sidered in light of the encoded and derived views of frequency
information.
Under the derived point-of-view, frequency estimates depend upon
aS's ability to retrieve the independent traces associated with the
the repetitions of a given item, and the various traces are more
readily retrievable if they are readily discriminable.

(58)

According
of

to Jacoby (1972), discriminabil ity depends upon the number

cont~xtual

have

features which the different traces for a repeated event

in common.

Therefore, the derived view of frequency would explain

the "spacing effect 11 by asserting that 'the distribution of repetitions
in a study list vwuld provide the different occurrences of an item with
considerably more distinct contextual environments than would be the
case

if the

repetitbns occurred in a successive fashion.

Lower

frequency judgments for items at a 0 spacing level can then be interpreted as a failure to discriminate the independent traces of a
repeated event on the basis of their contextual features.

The derived

point-of-view could also explain the lack of spacing effects for
paraphrased sentences in the present study if the exact wordings of
study sentences could be viewed as the semantic context in \>Jhich the
abstract representations of sentence meaning occurred.

Context would

then make the two occurrences of a paraphrased sentence readily discriminable no matter how widely the two synonomous sentences were
dispersed in a study list.

Again, Howe (1973) provides a more detailed

analysis of such processes.

~i

II

The "encoded" view of frequency suggested in the discussion of
present

findings, alternatively, maintains that frequency information

is directly entered into memory as a

~sums

different dimensions of the study material.
not

stimulus events along
The encoded position does

rely on the discriminability and retrievability of contextual inform-

ation at the time of test and therefore, different explanations must be
sought for the presence of spacing effects in judgments of twicepresented (2P-S) sentences and the absence of spacing effects in
judgments of paraphrased (2P-P) sentences in the pr·esent study.
Such explanations may be found if it can be assumed that lower

(59)
frequency

judgments under massed conditions of presentation are due

to a failure to adequately encode the :;econd presentation of an item
rather than to a failure to distinguish
traces.

bet~veen

ti·JO

adequately encoded

Hintzman (1974) has recently reviewed several theories of the

spacing effect; two of which interpret the relatively poor performance
with massed
tion.
and

items as a failure to properly encode the second presenta-

These theories have been labelled the "attention hypothesis"
the "habituation hypothesis.''
The attention hypothesis, on the one hand, assumes that the

inefficient storage of the second occurrence of a massed item is due to
a voluntary process on the part of the subject.

Very basically, the

hypothesis states that during the second presentation of a massed item,
a subject simply ceases processing of the item and rests or redirects
his

attention to the processing of other items in the study list.

reason
is

The

that a subject would undertake either of these two activities

presumably because he believes that he has sufficiently encoded the

item during the first occurrence.
The habituation hypothesis, alternatively, views the inefficient
encoding of the second occurrence of an item as due to some underlying
process over which the subject has no control.
likened

Hintzman (1974) has

the notion of habituation to a psychological refractory period

during

the threshold "for the response of storing a particular kind of

memory

trace"

occur

(p. 21) is raised.

Habituation, under this view, will

regardless of the subject's level of attention.

Either hypothesis

potentially provides the encoded view of frequency with an explanation
as

to why massed repetitions of items ltJould be less efficiently summed

than distributed repetitions of the i.tems.
While the present study was not designed to specifically evaluate

(60)

these

proposals, the findings can provide some insight into which of

tvlO

the two hypotheses would be more amenable to an explanation of spacing
effects

found

in the judgment of sentence frequency.

If the assumption

can be made that an abstract representation of a sentence's meaning is
stored
items

in memory and also, that the synonomous versions of paraphrased
result

in

the same abstract representation, it appears that a

situation has resulted in which a subject will not attenuate his
attention for the second occurrence of a paraphrase<;! sentence.

In the

JOM condition, the subject•s task is to judge the underlying meanings
of the sentences but because the underlying meaning of a sentence wi 11
not become apparent unt i 1 the sentence has been decoded and comprehended,
tences

the subject will not alter his attention to paraphrased seneven when the two versions are presented in immediate succession.

The altering of attention would, of course, be expected for sentences
rep~ated

in identical form.

paraphrased

items

The failure to find a spacing effect for

in Condition JOM provides some support for the attention

hypothesis.
If

the habituation notion of spacing is to be accepted, the

present findings suggest that it is the response of storing a rather
true copy of the sentence which habituates in the processing of sentence material.
sentences in

The failure to find a spacing effect for paraphrased

the JOM condition seems to indicate that the storage of the

abstract representation of a sentence 1 s meaning is not susceptible to
the habituation process.
Summary
Subjects in the present experiment succeeded in judging the
frequency of either the exact >-Jording or the underlying meaning of study
sentences.

Frequency estimates for paraphrased sentences clearly

( 61 )
indicated that subjects could focus on either surface properties of the
two

synonomous sentences or on the underlying "gist" of the two sen-

tences
1vere

dependIng upon the task demunds.

Because these task demands

not specIfIed unt I 1 after the sentences had been presented for

study,

it has

been argued that frequency information can be summed

simultaneously on a number of salient dimensions found in the sentence
material.
different

The

occ~rence

and nonoccurrence of spacing effects in

conditions of the present study have been considered in

light of an attention and a habituation hypothesis.
this

The findings of

experiment seem more amenable to an attention explanation.

If a

habituation process is occurring, it appears that the response of
storing

an exact representation of a sentence is decremented rather

than the response of storing an abstract trace of the sentence 1 s meaning.

~
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APPENDIX A
Sentence Material Used in the t1ixed and Unmixed Lists

Experimental sentences presented during study:
the original sentences and their paraphrases.
Mean Concreteness ratings are indicated in parentheses.

High Concreteness Sentences
The impenetrabb barricade obstructed the primary road.
The impassable barrier blocked the main highway.
(4.25)
The absent-minded attorney mishandled the critical case.
The forgetful lawyer bungled the important trial. (4. 50)
The pushy journalist questioned the dishonest politician.
The aggressive reporter quizzed the corrupt official. (4.25)
The frugal tourists rested in a spotless hotel.
The thrifty travelers relaxed in an immaculate inn.
The novice skydiver came dovm on the solid earth.
The amateur parachutist landed on the hard ground.
The murky fluid spoiled the clear stream.
The dark liquid ruined the unpolluted creek.

(4.75)
(4.25)

(4.25)

The curious researcher investigated an appealing subject.
The inquisitive experimenter studied an interesting topic.
A permanent stain tarnished the plush carpet.
An indelible blot discolored the thick rug.

(4.75)

The famished flock drank from the quiet pond.
(4.25)
The starving herd watered at the calm pool.
The large pol iceman stopped the expensive automobile.
The huge cop halted the high-priced car. (4.25)
The brave horsemen carried brilliant banners.
The courageous cavalry bore brightly-colored flags.

(4.50)

The intoxicated tramp staggered into the grimy tavern.
The drunken bum stumbled into the dingy bar. (4.75)

(67)

(4.50)

(68)

t1c:d i urn Cone re l enes s Sen tenccs
The angry soldier fired the deadly pistol.
The irritated G. I. shot the dangerous revolver.

(3.75)

The communitycitizens arranged the yearly feast.
The local residents organized the annual banquet.

(3.75)

The muscular boxer registered a brutal punch.
The burly fighter dealt a crushing blow. (3.50)
The nosey foreman observed the employee 1 s actions.
The snoopy supervisor watched the worker 1 s behavior.

(3.50)

The cunning robbers stole the precious timepiece.
The clever bandits swiped the invaluable clock. (3.75)
The feared sickness swept the 1 ittle village.
The small town was ravaged by the dreaded disease.
The tired army defeated the hated enemy.
The weary troops conquered the despised foes.

(3.75)

(3.50)

The cranky spinster slipped on the slick pavement.
The crabby old-maid fell on the slippery sidewalk.

{l1.00)

The repulsive creatures crawled through the spooky cemetery.
The ugly monsters crept through the eerie graveyard. (3.50)
The popular combo played a unique tune.
The well-liked band performed an unusual number.

(3.50)

The bold explorers traversed the desolate prairie.
The adventurous pioneers crossed the barren plain. (3.50)
An unexpected disaster ended the exhausting journey.
A sudden accident concluded the fatiguing trip. (3.50)
Low Concreteness Sentences
The controversial proposal caused a heated argument.
The debatable suggestion produced a violent dispute.
The upper class ruled over the common folk.
The elite caste reigned over the plain people.
The unsightly rubbish filled the empty street.
The unattractive trash covered the vacant avenue.

(2.00)

(3.00)
(3.25)

The scanty salary enraged the straiqhtforward assistants.
The meager pay cnfuriated the outsp~ken assistants. (2.25)

--

(69)

lhe wretched junkie longed for the prohibited dope.
The depraved addict craved the i !legal drugs. (2.00)
The \-Jinning team appeared to be an unbelievable long-shot.
The triumphant club seemed to be an incr-edible dark-horse.
A pungent odor f i 11 ed the intire home.
An unpleasant smell permeated the v,rhole house.

(3.25)

(2.75)

The good··looking lady was deceived by the handsome lad.
The pretty woman was tricked by the attractive boy.
(3.00)
The famed singer released a wonderful album.
(3.00)
The noted vocalist put out a fine record.
The growing business showed a sizable profit.
The prospering company displayed a considerable gain.
The apprehensive pupil wanted a good schooling.
The anxious student desired a sound education.

(3.00)

(2. 00)

The loyal typist defended her distinguished boss.
The faithful stenographer protected her respected employer.
Sentences Presented in the Primacy and Recency Buffers
of the Study Lists.
Once-presented Buffer Sentences
The wholesome cafe served good food.
The displeased executive pardoned his aloof colleague.
The s 1 i my frogs 1 i ved in the dreary swamps.
The imaginative artist stared at the shapely model.
An unshakeable faith in God fortifies religious people.
The decrepit docks could only accomodate a feq boats.
Twice-presented Buffer Sentences.
A rock edifice marked the remote boundary.
A stone monument signified the outmost border.
The sh r i 11 sound upset the contented chickens.
The piercing noise alarmed the satisfied hens.
Buffer Sentences Presented Three Times.
The cheerful child picked the lovely blossoms.
The happy youngster plucked the beautiful petals.
The gleeful tot gathered the gorgeous flowers.

(3.00)
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The skilled physician bandaged the painful wound.
The proficient surgeon covered the throbbing injury.
The expert doc tal- vn-apped the aching sore.

Filler Sentences Presented Three Times
in the Study and Test Lists.

The wild tyrant persecuted the radical sect.
The crue 1 ru 1er suppressed the dissenting facti on.
The hot-blooded dictator oppressed the revolutionary party.
A strong breeze heartened the sturdy sal lors.
A vigorous gale perked up the rugged boatmen.
A brisk wind gladened the hardy seafarers.
An unexpected disaster ended the exhausting journey.
A sudden accident concluded the fatiguing trip.
An unforeseen tradegy interupted the tiring voyage.

Sentences Presented Only at the Time of Test.
ThP devout minister co11nseled the parishoners,
The

penni less serfs reaped the autumn harvest.

The

tan

thoroughbred galloped the circular course.

The disorderly mob left the bust] ing station.
The modern slang astounded the scholarly instructors.
The

vain bookkeeper purchased a fashionable wig.

The crude
The

laborer gulped the icy beverage.

insane moron hurt the tiny dog.

The secret agent received a coded message.
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APPENDIX B
Analysis of Variance Summary Tables
Analysis of Variance for 2P-S and 2P-P Sentences in the Mixed Lists
(Instructions X Subjects X Type of Repetition X Lag X Concreteness Level)
Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

F

BetvJeen Ss
1

Instructions (I)
Subjects w I

70

99.445
1. 561

Hithin Ss
Type of Rep (T)
Lag

(L)

Concreteness (C)
IT
IL
TL
iC
TC

LC
ST w
SL vJ

sc

\tJ

ITL
lTC

ILC
TLC

STL w I
STC w I
SLC

w I

ITLC
STLC w
Total
~·d:

38.371
19.473
1.061
17.130
.659
14.826
2.247
1. 284
1. 901
38.218
76.309
66.133
.863
.914
1. 142
.290
58.070
72.569
159.825
. 142
149.625

140
2
2
4
4
140
140
280
4
280

1030.032

1295

denotes significance at the . 001 1eve 1
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I

2
2
1
2
2

38.371
9.737
. 531
17.130
.329
7.413

2

I. 123

2
4
70
Jl!O

.642
.475
.546
.545
.472
.431
.457
.285
.072
.415
.518
.570
.035
.534

70. 28o~·--·,
17. 864~·--·,
1. 124
31 . 376;':.':
17. 871 ~·,~·,
2.3/8
1. 238

1 • Ol~O

Ill
(73)

Testing Effects Analysis for lP, 2P-S, and 2P-P Sentences in the Mixed Lists
(Instructions X Subjects X Type of Sentence X Position in Test List)
___S_ums of So,uarc_s_ _ df

Source
BetvJeen

Mean Squar~---

Ss

Instructions (!)
Subjects w I

22.842
61 .892

1

70

22.842
.884

Within Ss
Type of Sen (T)
Pos i t i on ( P)
IT
IP

TP
ST w I
SP w I
ITP
STP w

Total

2
2
2
2

58.352
.799
8.594
.924
.671
37.857
35.394
1 . 153
64.351

140
140
4
280

292.809

647

4

29.176
.399
4.297
.462
. 168
.270
.253
.288
.229

107. 897•':>':
1. 579
15.890
1 .828

1. 254

**denotes significance at the .001 lRvel

Analysis of Variance for lP and 2P Sentences in Condition JOW for Unmixed Lists
(Type of Sentence X Concreteness Level X Subjects)
Source

Sums of Squares

Between Ss

7. 180

df

Mean Squares

F

17

Within Ss
----Type of Sen (T)
Concreteness (c)
TC
T by Ss
c by Ss
TC by Ss

14.208

1

. 141

. 146
3.143
4.528
2.780

2
2
17
34
34

Total

32. 126

107

.~,':denotes

significance at the .001 level

14.208
.070
.073
. 185
. 133
.082

76. 840•'d:

Ill
(74)
Analysis of Variance for 2P Sentences in Condition JO\.J of the Unmixed Lists
(Lag X Concreteness Level X Subjects)
Source

Sums of Squares

______
Between Ss

df

14.327

17

Lag (L)
Concreteness (c)
LC
L by Ss
c by Ss
LC by Ss

10.892
. 114
3.265
13.719
13. 164
28.456

2
2
4
34
34
68

Total

83.937

161

,_

~1ean

Squares

F

Within Ss
-

;'~·k

5.446
.057
.816
.404
.387
.419

13. 497~·~,·~
1.950

denotes significance at the .001 level

Analysis of Variance for 1P and 2P Sentences in Condition JOM for Unmixed
Lists (Type of Sentence X Concreteness Level X Subjects)
Source

Sums of Squares

df

1.965

I7

Type of Sen (T)
Concreteness (C)
TC
T by Ss
c by Ss
TC by Ss

14. 199
.097
.084
1. 633
2.755
1. 176

1
2
2
I7
34
34

Total

21.909

107

Between Ss

Mean Squares

F

Within Ss

~·n'~denotes

significance at the .001 level

14. 199
.049
.042
.096
.081
.035

147. 753~b·~
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Analysis of Variance for 2P Sentences in Condition JOM of the Unmixed Lists
(Lag X Concreteness Level X Subjects)
Source
Betvveen

Sums of Squares

9.f______Mea ~~

Sq uu._r_e_s____F_ _

17

Ss

\·Jithin Ss

L by Ss
C by Ss
LC by Ss

1. 948
.522
.599
10.552
7.812
19.985

2
2
4
34
34
68

Total

47.722

161

Lag

(L)

Concreteness (C)
LC

.974
.261
. 150
.310
.230
.294

3. 11+0
1.130

